Is Russian Gas Still Flowing Through Ukraine? Current Routes and Transit Rules

Russian natural gas continues to transit Ukraine via the existing pipeline network, but the volumes and legal frameworks have shifted significantly since the full-scale invasion began. While Gazprom has reduced direct exports through Ukraine, the transit route remains operational under a five-year agreement signed in 2020, which expires at the end of 2024. This arrangement allows gas to flow westward to Europe, though with stricter contractual terms and reduced capacity compared to pre-war levels.

How the Transit System Works Now

The current transit setup relies on two key pipelines: the Bruderschaft (also known as the Soyuz pipeline) and the Trans-Balkan route. Both systems cross Ukrainian territory before delivering gas to Slovakia and Hungary. Under the 2020 transit deal, Ukraine’s Naftogaz acts as the technical operator, ensuring gas flows while enforcing contractual limits. However, Gazprom has repeatedly threatened to bypass Ukraine entirely, citing disputes over transit fees and political conditions.

In 2023, transit volumes averaged around 12–15 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year, down from over 80 bcm in 2021. This decline reflects both reduced European demand and Gazprom’s strategic pivot toward alternative routes like TurkStream and Nord Stream (now largely inactive). Still, Ukraine’s pipeline system remains one of the few reliable overland corridors for Russian gas to reach EU markets, particularly in Central and Southeastern Europe.

Why the 2024 Deadline Matters

The 2020 transit agreement is set to expire on December 31, 2024, creating uncertainty about future flows. Ukraine has signaled it will not extend the deal unless its security and financial demands are met, including higher transit fees and guarantees against Russian sabotage. Meanwhile, the EU has accelerated efforts to diversify supplies, reducing its reliance on Russian gas by over 80% since 2021 through LNG imports and pipeline alternatives.

If no new agreement is reached, Gazprom could reroute remaining exports through TurkStream, which currently supplies Serbia, Hungary, and Austria. However, this would require additional compression capacity and could face EU regulatory hurdles. For now, Ukraine’s transit system remains a critical—but shrinking—piece of the puzzle for Russian gas exports to Europe.

Practical Implications for Consumers and Markets

For European buyers, the shift away from Ukrainian transit has already led to higher costs in some markets. Countries like Hungary and Slovakia, which historically relied on Ukrainian routes, have had to renegotiate contracts or increase storage inventories. In contrast, nations with direct access to LNG terminals (e.g., Poland, Lithuania) have seen more stable pricing.

For Ukraine, the transit fees—estimated at $2–3 billion annually before the war—are a vital revenue stream amid economic strain. Losing this income could further destabilize the country’s energy sector, which has already suffered from Russian attacks on infrastructure. Meanwhile, Gazprom faces its own challenges: rerouting gas through alternative pipelines is technically feasible but politically and economically costly, especially as EU sanctions tighten.

Sunset over the Ganges River in Varanasi, India, symbolizing the flow of resources like natural gas across geopolitical landscapes

What’s Next? Three Possible Scenarios

The future of Russian gas transit through Ukraine hinges on three key developments:

Extension of the 2020 deal: If Ukraine and Gazprom strike a new agreement, transit could continue at reduced volumes, but with stricter terms. This would require EU mediation to balance competing interests.
Full bypass via TurkStream: Gazprom could redirect all exports through TurkStream, but this would depend on EU approval and could trigger legal challenges under energy solidarity rules.
No transit agreement: If talks collapse, Russian gas exports to Europe via Ukraine would halt, accelerating the EU’s energy independence but potentially causing short-term supply disruptions in Central Europe.

The outcome will likely depend on the broader geopolitical climate, including the war’s trajectory and EU sanctions policy. For now, the pipelines remain operational—but the clock is ticking toward a critical decision point in late 2024.